For this exercise, we begin with ASSUMING the first premise is true:
1) If God knows the future, we don’t have actual free will (because the future is already set).
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Now we examine two different sets of premise+conclusion.
We start with Set A:
2) God knows the future.
3) Conclusion: Therefore, we don’t have free will.
The above is what deterministic Calvinists argue. The Calvinist panelist Chris Date says as much from 12:30 onwards:
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Next, we look at Set B:
2) We have free will.
3) Conclusion: Therefore, God does not know the future.
The above is the position of Open Theism.
As you can see, both Sets hinge upon Premise 1 actually being true. Hence why it has been stated that Deterministic Calvinism and Open Theism are two sides of the same coin. They just reject different premises that flow from that first Premise 1. (For this post, I’m not going to delve into whether Premise 1 is true, and hence whether Sets A and B are correct.)
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Related to the these two Sets and still maintaining the assumption of Premise 1, the following is an atheist twist on it – Dan Barker’s FANG, the Freewill Argument for the Nonexistence of God:
1) If God knows the future, then HE doesn’t have actual free will (because the future is already set).
2) God knows His own future.
3) Therefore, God doesn’t have free will.
TBH I feel this is a silly argument. God cannot change His decisions cos He knows the future? That’s reversing cause and effect. If God changes His decision, the future will change contingent upon God’s choices.
It’s almost like saying just because I know what I want to do in the next 10 seconds, therefore I have no free will. (???)